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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
KEENE CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
R. W. TAYLOR STEEL 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
RALPH W. TAYLOR and 
LOU JEAN M. TAYLOR, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 15787 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF ITS PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appeal from Judgment of the Second Judicial 
District Court, Weber County, State of Utah 
The Honorable John H. Wahlquist 
R. BRENT STEPHENS 
RICHARD K. CRANDALL, of 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants 
DAVID A. GREENWOOD of 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCARTHY 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
c 
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KEENE CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
R. W. TAYLOR STEEL 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
RALPH w. TAYLOR and 
LOU JEAN M. TAYLOR, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 15787 
Pursuant to Rule 76(e), appellants hereby petition the 
court for a rehearing in the above-entitled matter. 
The ground and reason for this petition is that the 
court's opinion, dated April 13, 1979, is based upon an 
interpretation of Federal Antitrust Laws, a duty which is 
within the exclusi~urisdiction of Federal Courts. 
',.,.---;; 
DATED this,/' day of May, 1979. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
~~.-·, B;-~~~/ 
Richard K. Crandall 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants 
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KEENE CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
R. W. TAYLOR STEEL 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
RALPH w. TAYLOR and 
LOU JEAN M. TAYLOR, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 15787 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF ITS PETITION FOR REHEARING 
This is an action by Keene Corporation (hereinafter 
"Keene") against R. w. Taylor Steel Company, Ralph w. Taylor 
and Lou Jean M. Taylor (hereinafter "Taylors") for the 
purchase price of goods sold on trade account to Grating, 
Inc. (hereinafter "Grating"). The Taylors' liability hinges 
on their guaranty of Grating's trade account. The Taylors 
claim a defense available to Grating which arises from 
Keene's anti-trust violations. 
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I 
NEITHER THIS COURT NOR THE LOWER COURT 
HAS THE JURISDICTION TO I~TEPPPET OP APPLY 
FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS AND THIS COURT'S 
OPINION AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURTS' DECI-
SION NOT TO STAY THIS ACTION UNTIL THE 
COMPLETION OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST ACTION 
DENIES THE DEFENDANTS THEIR RIGHT TO ASSERT 
A VALID DEFENSE BASED UPON VIOLATION OF THE 
FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS. 
The only bas is for Keene's recovery against the Taylors 
is the Taylors' guaranty of Grating's trade account with 
Keene. It is axiomatic that one who guarantees a debt has 
all the defenses available to the party who incurs the debt: 
[SJ ince the liability of a surety is commen-
surate with that of the principal, where the prin-
cipal is not liable on the obligation neither is 
the guarantor. U.S. Leasing Corporation vs. 
DuPont, 70 Cal.Rptr. 393, 444 P.2d 65, 75 (Cal. 
1968). See also Continental National Bank vs. 
Dolan, 564 P.2d 995 (Colo. App. 1977). 
Without doubt if Grating has a defense to Keene's claim, 
then the Taylors, having guaranteed Grating's payment, have 
the same defense. 
Putting all other defenses aside, it was argued before 
this court that Grating does indeed have an anti-trust 
defense to Keene's claim. The foundation for this asserti~ 
is the pending action of Grating, Inc. v. Keene Corporati~ 
and Harsco wherein Grating contends that Keene and Harsco 
engaged in illegal price-fixing and illegal refusals to 
deal. As noted by the court in its Opinion in this matter, 
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the United States Supreme Court decided in Continental Wall 
paper Co. v. Louis Voight and Sons Co., 212 U.S. 277, 29 
s.ct. 280, 53 L.Ed. 416 (1909), that an anti-trust violation 
can be an affirmative defense to a contract action. (p.2). 
Leaving out for the moment any consideration whether 
Continental Wall Paper is good law today, it must be made 
clear the consequences of the existence or non-existence of 
Grating's anti-trust defense to the purchase contracts which 
the Taylors guaranteed. If Grating's anti-trust defense is 
valid, the Taylors may well have no obligation to pay the 
balance of the trade account. In this event, judgment 
should be reversed and directed in favor of the Taylors. 
If Grating's anti-trust defense is invalid, the Taylors 
ought to honor their guaranty. Judgment then belongs to 
Keene. Thus the crux of the matter is whether an anti-trust 
defense is available to Grating. 
This question whether anti-trust defense exists is 
presently being litigated in Grating, Inc. v. Keene Corpora-
tion and Harsco, Civil No. NC-75-21, now pending in the U.S. 
District Court of Utah for the Northern Division, and 
set for trial in September of this year, the defense is 
before the court by virtue of Keene's counterclaim for the 
balance of the trade account incurred by Grating. Under 
Section 15 of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 15 u.s.c.A. §15, 
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which gives exclusive jurisdiction in these matters to the 
federal courts, the consideration of this matter is only 
proper in the federal courts. 
Whether a defense based upon violations of federal 
anti-trust laws is valid is not a proper matter of considera· 
tion for this court or the trial court. Exclusive juri~i~ 
tion concerning federal anti-trust laws has been given to 
the federal courts under Section 15 of the Clayton Act. 
This point was adequately made by Keene in its Appellate 
Brief. Keene there cited, among other cases, General Talkinq 
Pictures v. De Maree, 275 N.W. 750 (Minn. 1938), where the 
court stated: 
Whether by way of attack or defense, once raised, 
the issue is the same. Its determination in 
either case would require this court to apply 
federal law, the construction of which is express-
ly and exclusively placed with the federal courts. 
279 N.W. at 753. (Noted in Respondent's Appellate 
Brief at 15). 
It is beyond question that the existence or non-existenci 
of Grating's anti-trust defense should not be determined~ 
this court or the trial court, but by a federal court. 
It is respectfully submitted that this court went beyond 
its authority in its Opinion affirming the trial court judg-
ment for Keene. Although this court noted that the anti-
trust defense was permissible under Continental Wall PaP!!:• 
this court went on to decided tdhat Continental Wall Paper 
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had been implicitly overruled. This is nothing more than 
construing and applying federal anti-trust law and deciding, 
as a matter of federal law, that Grating does not have an 
anti-trust defense. Both appellant and respondents agreed 
that under the law, this court had no authority to make such 
a decision. It makes no difference that the court's analysis 
might be correct. What matters is that the anti-defense 
exclusively belong to a federal court for determination. 
Therefore, this court erred in construing and applying 
federal anti-trust law. 
In this case, this court is placed in a serious dilemma. 
Cn one side it recognizes that if Grating has a valid defense 
against Keene, then the Taylors as guarantors have the same 
defense and thus should prevail as a matter of law. On the 
other side, this court is without authority to determine the 
validity of the anti-trust defense. To add to this diffi-
culty, the federal court which has power to adjudicate the 
validity of the anti-trust defense has not yet resolved the 
issue. 
Logically, there are two avenues that may be followed; 
rationally there is but one. the first would be to affirm 
the trial court's striking of the anti-trust defense. This 
should not be done as a matter of federal law for, as 
discussed earlier, the validity of the anti-trust defense is 
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reserved exclusively for the federal courts. If the strikin~ 
of the anti-trust defense is to be affirmed, it must rest on 
the trial court's incapacity to decide whether there is an 
anti-trust defense, coupled with the trial court's impatience 
to wait for the federal court to decide the issue. Such a 
determination is tantamount to telling a defendant that 
although he may have a valid defense, the court will not 
allow it to be presented because the court which should make 
the decision has not as yet done so. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to see any reason 
in such a Procrustean approach. Not only is it patently 
inequitable, but it presents two serious problems. First, 
it yeilds the same results as if the court decided to 
construe the anti-trust defense (against the Taylors) which 
is contrary to the Clayton Act. It hardly seems judicious 
to say that since the court cannot decide the issue of 
defense, it will not allow it. The difference between the 
approaches is wholly a matter of technical subterfuge to 
avoid a substantive claim. This is made all the more 
obvious by the second problem that dismissing the anti-
trust defense creates. 
If the court affirms the striking of the anti-trust 
defense with the resultant judgment for Keene, it faces the 
very real potential of creating additional litigation and 
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inconsistent results. Should the federal district court 
which has the same question before it allow Grating the 
antitrust defense against Keene, Grating would then not be 
obligated to pay the trade account balance to Keene. This 
result will not really disturb Keene for it will have 
already recovered the amount from the Taylors. But it will 
place the Taylors in the position of having paid out a 
guaranty on a subsequently determined unenforceable contract. 
The Taylors will then be put in the position of suffe~ing 
the loss or return to court. 
It is altogether possible that the Taylors could be 
stuck for the loss on an unenforceable contract to which 
they were not even a party. Certainly adopting such an 
approach is not in the interest of sound judicial discretion, 
especially in light of the alternative approach. 
The second approach, and altogether the only rational 
one, is to stay the proceedings until the federal court with 
the jurisdiction to decide the issue of the anti-trust 
defense does so. This would avaoid all the problems the 
first approach presents. This court would not need to 
strike what may be a valid defense simply because it lacks 
~thority to decide on the defense. Further, it avoids any 
possibility of inconsistent results. And lastly, the 
Taylors would not face the position of having been compelled 
to pay out on an unenforceable contract. 
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Keene in its appellate brief, makes two arguments 
against this approach. First, it argues that since Grating 
received the goods, it ought to pay the price rather than 
use the proceeds to finance its litigation against Keene. 
(p. 39). This argument has two flaws. Where Keene acquired 
the idea that the proceeds were being used to prosecute the 
case against itself is unclear. Certainly it cannot be 
found in the record. But more important, the argument begs 
the question for it assumes that Grating is obliged to pay, 
the whole question of the anti-trust defense which only a 
federal court ~ay decide. Certainly, such circuitous 
reasoning cannot stand. 
Keene's second argument against staying the proceedi~s 
is equally erroneous. Keene states: 
No stay of this action is necessary because 
Grating, Inc. and defendants will receive whatever 
remedy they are entitled to from the anti-trust 
claims against Keene in the pending federal action. 
(Emphasis added). Respondent's Appellate Brief 
at 40. 
The fallacy of this argument is obvious when it is noted 
that R. W. Taylor Steel Company, R. W. Taylor and Lou Jean 
M. Taylor are not parties to "anti-trust claims against 
Keene in the pending federal action". For that reason, the 
Taylors cannot receive any remedy in the federal action as 
Keene so blatantly asserts. Certainly, Keene could have 
named the Taylors as counter-defendants there and thus 
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avoided the present dilemma, but it chose not to do so. 
Thus, both of Keene's arguments against staying the proceed-
ings are inapplicable. 
In summation, the Taylors as guarantors of Grating's 
trade accounts have any defense Grating may have to the 
contract. Grating claims, and there is reasonable grounds 
for the claim, that Keene's anti-trust violations excuse 
Grating from the contract. If this is so, Keene may have no 
judgment against the Taylors. But the validity of this 
defense cannot be determined by this court for the matt€r 
belongs exclusively to the federal courts. Thus in affirm-
ing the decision of the lower court in this case, refusing 
to stay the action, this court has denied the Taylors a 
defense to which the federal court may well determined they 
are entitled. 
DATED this day of May, 1979. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINE~U 
__ _-.---:;; .. ---.. 
By / .· ~< , ~ _:!'...c::::::>' 
Richard K. Crandall 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Appel lants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served appellant's Petition 
for Rehearing and Brief in support thereof, on respondent 
Keene Corporation, by causing a true and correct copy 
thereof to be mailed, postage prepaid, to David A. Greenwood, 
Vancott, Bagley, Cornwall and McCarthy, 141 East 1st South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on the 18th day of May, 1979. 
DATED this ----1:__ 
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